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I. Introduction 
The revelations about the National Security Agency’s 
surveillance programs have raised significant questions about how 
government agencies handle sensitive information gathered 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, Pepperdine University; Co-
Founder of AirMap. This Essay is adapted from Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and 
Aerial Surveillance, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498116. 
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through surveillance techniques and other electronic means. As 
drones become an important tool used by the government, 
questions will arise about how government agencies store and 
protect information gathered by drones. This Essay outlines key 
data retention considerations that government operators of drones 
should examine.  
This Essay makes three key points. First, to address the 
possibility that drones and other sophisticated aerial surveillance 
technology will allow the government to build a comprehensive 
picture of an entire community’s daily movements (a different 
persistent surveillance harm), governments should enact laws 
mandating data retention procedures that require heightened 
levels of suspicion and increased procedural protections for 
accessing stored data gathered by aerial surveillance, coupled with 
a requirement that data be deleted after a legislatively-mandated 
period of time. 
Second, governments should impose enhanced transparency 
and accountability measures, requiring agencies to publish on a 
regular basis information about the use of aerial surveillance 
devices—both manned and unmanned—and should consider 
creating local oversight boards to police the use of surveillance 
technologies.   
Third, legal reformers should recognize that technology such 
as auto-redaction may make aerial surveillance by drones more 
protective of privacy than human surveillance. 
II. Background on Drones 
On the Sunday of President’s Day weekend, 2015, Secretary of 
Transportation Anthony Foxx and FAA Administrator Michael 
Huerta convened a hastily arranged public conference call to 
announce pending regulations that would allow for the integration 
of drones into the national airspace. The regulations are historic; 
for the first time in American history, aircraft operating without 
onboard pilots would have a regulatory regime to govern their use. 
Sunday of a holiday weekend was an odd time to announce the 
most significant aviation-related regulations since the creation of 
the FAA, but the agency’s hand was forced. A little more than 
twenty-four hours before the conference call, I wrote a column for 
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Forbes that revealed the details of the pending regulations—the 
Associated Press and the Wall Street Journal credited the column 
with first reporting the news that forced the FAA to announce their 
regulations.1  
The use of drones for surveillance has to date been a sparsely 
discussed topic in legal scholarship; the FAA’s proposed changes to 
federal law, however, make it all but certain that drones will be a 
catalyst for new ways of thinking about privacy and surveillance.2 
This Essay seeks to frame future discussions about how state and 
local governments will handle the privacy issues associated with 
aerial surveillance by proposing innovative reforms that move 
beyond the call for requiring warrants for the use of drones.  
The FAA’s proposed rule is just the start of a new era in 
aviation, as it is estimated that 30,000 drones will be flying in the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Gregory S. McNeal, Leaked FAA Document Provides Glimpse Into 
Drone Regulations, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
gregorymcneal/2015/02/14/the-faa-may-get-drones-right-after-all-9-insights-into-
forthcoming-regulations/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (noting “AP and The Wall 
Street Journal credited this post with first reporting the story about the 
regulations, which are now out for public comment”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Jack Nicas, Federal Document Sheds Light on Proposed 
Drone Rules, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/online-
document-sheds-light-on-proposed-drone-rules-1423960620 (last visited June 23, 
2015) (acknowledging that the impending regulations were first reported by 
Forbes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Joan Lowy, FAA 
Seeking Drone Rules Favorable to Commercial Operators, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 
14, 2015), http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/f70471f764144b2fab526d39972 
d37b3/Article_2015-02-14-US--FAA-Drones/id-381ad5339b3348d984da077c86a2 
2b25 (last visited June 23, 2015) (noting that the story was first reported by 
Forbes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 2. Technically known as unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned aircraft 
systems, this Essay will refer to these devices by their colloquial name—drones. 
For some of the prescient articles discussing drones or surveillance issues that 
might touch on drones, see generally M. Ryan Calo, The Drone As Privacy 
Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2011); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The 
Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); Margot E. Kaminski, 
Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. 
CIRCUIT 57 (2013); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155 
(2015); Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need 
for State Legislation, HARV. J. LEGIS. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492374; Andrew B. Talai, Drones and Jones: The 
Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CAL. L. REV. 729 
(2014); Wells C. Bennett, Civilian Drones, Privacy, and the Federal-State Balance, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/09/ 
civilian-drones-and-privacy (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
1142 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139 (2015) 
national airspace (NAS) by the end of the decade.3 But even more 
drones are coming. According to the FAA, “[O]nce the entire 
integration process is complete, the FAA envisions the NAS 
populated with UAS that operate well beyond the operational 
limits proposed in [the rule announced on February 15, 2015.]”4  
Drones will be a catalyst for new ways of thinking about 
privacy and surveillance, but contrary to the hopes of many 
advocates, the issue of privacy was not addressed in the FAA’s 
proposed rules.5 Rather, the FAA explicitly stated that matters 
related to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties were beyond the 
                                                                                                     
 3. The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy 
Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 
(2013) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 4. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, at 34 
(proposed Feb. 15, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 
107 & 183) [hereinafter NPRM],  https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ 
rulemaking/recently_published/media/2120-AJ60_NPRM_2-15-
2015_joint_signature.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Patrice Hendriksen, Unmanned and Unchecked: Confronting 
the Unmanned Aircraft System Privacy Threat Through Interagency 
Coordination, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 207, 212 (2013) (proposing FAA involvement 
in an interagency process among UAS federal stakeholders to address privacy); 
Kellan Howell, Invasion: 7,500 Drones in U.S. Airspace Within 5 Years, FAA 
Warns, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/ 
nov/7/faa-chief-announces-progress-drone-regs/?page=all (last visited June 23, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Keith Lain, Markey: 
Privacy Before Drone Deliveries, HILL (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:53 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/191722-markey-protect-privacy-before-
drone-deliveries (last visited June 23, 2015) (“Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) said 
privacy protections need to be in place before Amazon starts delivering packages 
with drones.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Matthew J. 
Schwartz, FAA Promises Privacy Standards For Domestic Drones, DARK READING 
(Feb. 15, 2013, 11:39 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/faa-
promises-privacy-standards-for-domestic-drones/d/d-id/1108691? (last visited 
June 23, 2015) (“The Federal Aviation Administration Thursday announced that 
it will publicly develop privacy policies to cover the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), more often referred to as drones, in U.S. airspace.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jay Stanley, New Eyes in the Sky: 
Protecting Privacy from Domestic Drone Surveillance, ACLU (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/new-eyes-sky-
protecting-privacy-domestic-drone (last visited June 23, 2015) (“In the report, we 
discuss the current drone landscape (technology and use), talk about the privacy 
issues, and conclude with recommendations for protections we believe must be 
put in place to ensure they don’t destroy our privacy.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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scope of their rulemaking.6 Instead, President Obama directed 
that those privacy issues related to the federal government’s use of 
drones would be handled according to terms outlined in a 
Presidential Memorandum, while the issues raised by private uses 
of drones would be addressed through rules that will be created in 
a multi-stakeholder process led by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a 
subordinate agency of the Department of Commerce.7 
III. The President’s Order Regarding Federal Government Drone 
Operations 
The federal government has taken very little action with 
regard to data retention procedures for drones. Rather than 
directing the FAA to promulgate regulations to address privacy, 
the President instead issued an executive order, styled as an 
executive memorandum.8 That memorandum directed the federal 
                                                                                                     
 6. NPRM, supra note 4, at 36. 
 7. Id.; see Gregory S. McNeal, What You Need To Know About The Federal 
Government’s Drone Privacy Rules, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-coming-
heres-what-president-obama-thinks-about-privacy/ (last visited June 23, 2015) 
(“The President directed the Department of Commerce’s, National 
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA) to initiate a process 
for creating privacy, accountability and transparency rules for commercial and 
private uses of drones.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Presidential Memorandum, Promoting Economic Competitiveness While 
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, WHITE HOUSE, § 2(b) (Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter 
Drone Privacy Memo] https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/ 
presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (“Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the 
Department of Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration, and in consultation with other interested agencies, 
will initiate this multi-stakeholder engagement process . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. On the subtle differences between an Executive Order and other forms 
of executive action such as presidential memoranda, see John Contrubis, 
Executive Orders and Proclamations, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS No. 95-722A (1999) 
Both are undefined, written instruments by which the President 
directs, and governs actions by, Government officials and agencies. 
They differ in that executive orders must be published in the Federal 
Register whereas presidential memoranda are similarly published only 
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government to create standards for how the federal government 
will address the privacy issues associated with drones.9 Under the 
Order, federal government agencies and some recipients of federal 
funds will have one year to implement the President’s policies and 
make them publicly available.10 
The President’s memorandum acknowledges that drones “may 
play a transformative role in fields as diverse as urban 
infrastructure management, farming, public safety . . . and 
disaster response.”11 The Order acknowledges that drones are a 
lower-cost alternative to manned aircraft and can reduce risks to 
human life.12 The President’s directive takes account of “the 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns these systems may 
raise.”13 The memorandum segments federal government drone 
operations from privately operated drones and leaves the matter 
of state and locally operated drones—except those purchased with 
federal funds—to be addressed by the states.14  
The President’s order requires agencies to implement the 
guidelines below and inform the public about how to access their 
policies by February 15, 2016.15 The memorandum requires federal 
agencies to examine their drone policies prior to the adoption of 
new drone technology and at least every three years thereafter.16 
                                                                                                     
if the President determines that they have “general applicability and 
legal effect.” 
 9. See Drone Privacy Memo, supra note 7 (establishing “transparent 
principles that govern the Federal Government’s use of UAS in the NAS, and to 
promote the responsible use of this technology in the private and commercial 
sectors”).  
 10. See id. § 1(e) (“Within 1 year of the date of this memorandum, agencies 
shall publish information on how to access their publicly available policies and 
procedures implementing this section.”).  
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. (“As compared to manned aircraft, UAS may provide lower-cost 
operation and augment existing capabilities while reducing risks to human 
life.”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. § 1(c) (“[R]equire that State, local, tribal, and territorial 
government recipients of Federal grant funding for the purchase or use of UAS 
for their own operations have in place policies and procedures to safeguard 
individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such 
funds.”). 
 15. Id. § 1(e). 
 16. See id. § 1(a) (“Accordingly, agencies shall, prior to deployment of new 
UAS technology and at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS policies 
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The memorandum notes that drones must only be used in a 
manner consistent “with the Constitution, federal law, and other 
applicable regulations and policies.”17 It also reaffirms that 
individuals have the right to seek access to, and amendment of, 
records associated with drone usage.18 
The President’s memorandum also creates new requirements 
for the collection of information by drones and requires that 
agencies only collect information “to the extent that such collection 
or use is consistent with and relevant to an authorized purpose.”19 
Information collected by drones that is not maintained in a system 
of records covered by the Privacy Act shall not be disseminated 
outside the agency, unless dissemination is required by law or 
fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with agency 
requirements.20 If information collected using drones contains 
personally identifiable information (PII), that information  
shall not be retained for more than 180 days unless the 
retention is determined to be necessary to an authorized 
mission of the retaining agency, is maintained in a system of 
records covered by the Privacy Act, or is required to be retained 
for a longer period by any other applicable law or regulation.21 
To address civil liberties, the memorandum mostly references 
existing laws. Specifically, it calls on agencies to ensure that they 
have policies to “prohibit the collection, use, retention, or 
dissemination of data in any manner that would violate the First 
Amendment” or would illegally discriminate based on protected 
categories like ethnicity, race, gender, etc.22 It also mandates that 
drone-related activities are “performed in a manner consistent 
                                                                                                     
and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of 
information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties are protected.”). 
 17. Id. § 1. 
 18. See id. (“[A]nd permits individuals to seek access to and amendment of 
records.”). 
 19. Id. § 1(a)(ii). 
 20. See id. § 1(a)(iii) (“UAS-collected information that is not maintained in 
a system of records covered by the Privacy Act shall not be disseminated outside 
of the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized 
purpose and complies with agency requirements.”). 
 21. Id. § 1(a)(ii). 
 22. Id. § 1(b)(i). 
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with the Constitution and applicable laws, Executive Orders, and 
other Presidential directives.”23 The memorandum requires 
agencies to ensure that they have in place a means to “receive, 
investigate, and address, as appropriate, privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties complaints.”24 
Oversight and accountability of Federal drone operations will 
require creation of new procedures or modification of existing 
procedures.25 Agencies will be required to ensure that their 
oversight procedures “including audits or assessments, comply 
with existing policies and regulations.”26 Federal government 
personnel and contractors who work on drone programs will 
require rules of conduct and training, and procedures will need to 
be implemented for reporting suspected cases of misuse or abuse 
of drone technologies.27 
In a passage particularly relevant to this Essay, the 
memorandum addresses the matter of drones shared with state 
and local governments, drones purchased with federal funds, and 
information gathered by drones that are shared with others. The 
memorandum directs that such operations must comply with the 
Executive Order and applicable laws and regulations.28 If agencies 
authorize the use of drones in response to requests from federal, 
state, local, tribal, or territorial government operations, it will 
need to be conducted pursuant to established policies and 
procedures.29 Also, state, local, tribal, or territorial government 
recipients of federal grant funding for the purchase or use of drones 
will need to have in place policies and procedures to safeguard 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. § 1(b)(ii). 
 24. Id. § 1(b)(iii). 
 25. See id. § 1(a) (“Agencies shall update their policies and procedures, or 
issue new policies and procedures, as necessary.”). 
 26. Id. § 1(c)(i). 
 27. See id. § 1(c)(ii) (“[V]erify the existence of rules of conduct and training 
for Federal Government personnel and contractors . . . establish policies and 
procedures, or confirm that policies and procedures are in place . . . .”). 
 28. See id. § 1(b)(ii) (“[E]nsure that UAS activities are performed in a 
manner consistent with the Constitution and applicable laws, Executive 
Orders, and other Presidential directives . . . .”). 
 29. See id. § 1(c)(3) (“[E]stablish policies and procedures, or confirm that 
policies and procedures are in place, to authorize the use of UAS in response to 
a request for UAS assistance in support of Federal, State, local, tribal, or 
territorial government operations . . . .”). 
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privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such 
funds.30 These are relatively minor changes that do very little to 
impact most drone operations, as most operations were likely 
already complying with federal laws and regulations—which, as 
the subsequent sections of this Essay point out, impose very few 
restrictions on aerial surveillance. 
On transparency, the memorandum takes measures to provide 
the public with greater information about the federal government’s 
use of drones. The memorandum attempts to balance privacy with 
national security and law enforcement interests. It requires 
agencies to provide notice to the public regarding where in the 
national airspace an agency’s drones are permitted to operate.31 
Agencies must also keep the public informed of their drone 
programs and any changes that would significantly affect privacy, 
civil rights, or civil liberties.32 On an annual basis, agencies must 
also provide a general summary of their drone operations during 
the previous fiscal year.33 That summary must “include a brief 
description of types or categories of missions flown, and the 
number of times the agency provided assistance to other agencies, 
or to State, local, tribal, or territorial governments.”34 
IV. The Need for Action in States and Municipalities Regarding 
Data Handling Procedures 
While the controversy over NSA surveillance techniques 
raised questions about how the NSA gathered information about 
targets (and collaterally gathered information about non-targets), 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. § 1(c)(vi) (“[R]equire that State, local, tribal, and territorial 
government recipients of Federal grant funding for the purchase or use of UAS 
for their own operations have in place policies and procedures to safeguard 
individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such 
funds.”). 
 31. See id. § 1(d)(i) (“[P]rovide notice to the public regarding where the 
agency’s UAS are authorized to operate in the NAS . . . .”). 
 32. See id. § 1(d)(ii) (“[K]eep the public informed about the agency’s UAS 
program as well as changes that would significantly affect privacy, civil rights, 
or civil liberties . . . .”). 
 33. See id. § 1(d)(iii) (“[M]ake available to the public, on an annual basis, a 
general summary of the agency’s UAS operations during the previous fiscal 
year . . . .”). 
 34. Id. 
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what was also revealed were the extensive administrative 
procedures governing the collection, retention, and access to stored 
data.35 As state and local governments begin to collect massive 
amounts of information from drones, it raises significant questions 
about whether those local governments have the same 
sophisticated audit and compliance procedures that the federal 
government claims it has.  
Focusing merely on federal rules and federal operations 
obscures a huge portion of the discussion, as state and local 
operators will be the government actors most likely to use drones 
in search and rescue operations and in support of law enforcement 
activity, like serving a warrant or documenting a crime scene.36 
Similarly, the information gathered from a drone for law 
enforcement will be stored on law enforcement computers and will 
be subject to state and local laws governing the handling of 
personally identifying information and information disclosure.37 
                                                                                                     
 35. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (addressing said concerns 
and the various sources that cover related administrative procedures). 
 36. Cf. MATT LEWIS, MESA CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, MSCO UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM TEAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2014),  
http://sheriff.mesacounty.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=1
1383&libID=11401 (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (“We most often use [UAS] for 
crime scene photography, and search and rescue missions.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); 2011–2012 FAA List of Drone License 
Applicants, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/2012-
faa-list-drone-applicants (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (listing drone license 
applicants, including various federal, state, and educational entities) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kevin Bonham, Grand Forks County 
Drone Assists at Bemidji Blast Scene, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:35 
PM), http://www.grandforksherald.com/news/region/3666035-grand-forks-county-
drone-assists-bemidji-blast-scene (last visited June 22, 2015) (discussing how a 
Grand Forks County Sheriff’s Department drone assisted in the investigation of 
a gas explosion that destroyed a house) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Cyrus Farivar, San Jose Police Department Says FAA Can’t Regulate Its 
Drone Use, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 6, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/08/san-jose-police-say-faa-cant-regulate-its-drone-use-faa-disagrees/ 
(last visited June 22, 2015) (explaining that the San Jose police want to use 
drones mainly to access potential explosive devices) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Ed Pilkington, “We See Ourselves as the Vanguard”: The 
Police Force Using Drones to Fight Crime, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/drones-police-force-crime-uavs-
north-dakota (last visited June 22, 2015) (detailing the ways the Grand Forks 
Sheriff’s department has used their drone) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 37. See Stephen Rushin, The Legislative Response to Mass Police 
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Significant law and policy issues will arise at the local level, and it 
is not clear that local governments are prepared. In fact, state and 
local governments will be the preeminent battleground for law and 
policy debates about drones, and it appears they are far behind in 
crafting rules to handle the data they are about to collect. 
V. Data Retention Procedures for Drones 
A. Adopt Data Retention Procedures that Require Heightened 
Levels of Suspicion and Increased Procedural 
Protections Over Time 
Many critics of drones raise the legitimate concern that the 
government’s collection of aerial imagery and video will enable 
pervasive wide-area surveillance that allows the government to 
know what all citizens are doing at all points in time. Such 
warehousing of information may even allow government officials 
to review footage years after its collection, revealing the most 
intimate details about a person’s life. This is not a problem unique 
to drones but is rather a recurring theme in critiques of all video 
and still imagery collection. Legislators should adopt policies that 
address collection and retention of information in a way that 
focuses on the information that is collected, how it is stored, and 
how it is accessed, rather than the particular technology used to 
collect the information. Thus, while this section speaks specifically 
about aerial surveillance, the principles articulated here apply to 
all forms of video and imagery collection.  
To protect against pervasive surveillance and warehousing of 
data about citizens, legislators should enact retention policies and 
procedures that make it more difficult for the government to access 
information as time passes. Eventually, information collected by 
                                                                                                     
Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 53–56 (2013) (discussing the data integrity, 
access, and privacy of surveillance data collected by police); Corey Ciocchetti, Just 
Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of Personally 
Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 617 (2008) (overviewing 
the laws regarding the collection of personally identifying information some 
states have in place for both state and local agencies and businesses); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 11019.9 (West 2015) (mandating each state agency enact and maintain a 
permanent privacy policy); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-502 (West 2014) 
(requiring each government entity of the state create a privacy policy). 
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the government should be destroyed at the end of a pre-determined 
period of time. While the specific duration of time and processes 
may be subject to debate, all procedures and timelines should be 
legislatively determined, ensuring that they cannot be modified by 
individual agencies. To protect the rights of individuals, the 
information gathered and stored should be exempt from Sunshine 
Act requests but should be fully discoverable in any criminal 
prosecution.38 
A few procedural ideas are outlined below that will form the 
bulk of any responsible retention procedure:  
• From the moment of collection to up to thirty days after 
collection, information should be treated like any other 
contemporaneous or near contemporaneous observation. 
Government agents should be able to monitor aerial 
surveillance in real time or near real time, just as they 
observe CCTV’s in real time or near real time. This 
thirty-day window will allow law enforcement to respond to 
immediate or nearly immediate complaints about violations 
of the law.  
• After thirty days have passed from initial collection, 
information collected from aerial surveillance should be 
moved from servers openly accessible by law enforcement 
to servers that are only accessible with a court order and a 
showing of reasonable suspicion.  
• After ninety days have passed from initial collection, police 
should not be allowed to access information stored on 
servers without a court order and a showing of probable 
cause that the information contained on the servers 
contains evidence of a crime.  
• All information stored on servers should be automatically 
deleted after a period of time so that the government does 
not maintain a long-term archive of information about 
individuals. That period of time may be as short as 120 days 
but should not be longer than five years.  
                                                                                                     
 38. Note that while I argue the information gathered should be exempt from 
Sunshine Act requests, the transparency recommendations below contend that 
the fact of collection and the government’s use of aerial surveillance technology 
should be subject to transparency and accountability reforms and heightened 
oversight.  
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As with prior proposals, these limits are general guidelines 
with inherent policy trade-offs. A jurisdiction may value law 
enforcement prerogatives over privacy and may choose to place a 
greater emphasis on having data accessible for longer periods of 
time without a showing of cause, and consequently might move the 
thirty-day limit to a sixty-day limit. That decision might enhance 
the law enforcement value of aerial surveillance data, but it would 
also impose a civil liberties cost. Such decisions are best calibrated 
at the local level, where legislatures can gauge their particular 
crime levels and their constituents’ desires for privacy.39 
B. Adopt Transparency and Accountability Measures 
Transparency and accountability measures should be 
required, regardless of whether legislators follow the 
recommendations in this Essay or choose to follow the ill-conceived 
warrant based approach. Transparency and accountability 
measures may be more effective than suppression rules or 
warrants for controlling and deterring wrongful government 
surveillance. To hold law enforcement accountable, legislators 
should mandate that the use of all aerial surveillance devices—
manned or unmanned—be published on a regular basis, perhaps 
quarterly, on the website of the agency operating the system.  
These usage logs should detail who operated the system, when 
it was operated, where it was operated (including GPS 
coordinates), and what the law enforcement purpose for the 
operation was. Legislators may even mandate that unmanned 
systems operated in their jurisdictions come equipped with 
software that allows for the easy export of flight logs that contain 
this information. Such logs will allow privacy advocates and 
concerned citizens to closely monitor how aerial surveillance 
                                                                                                     
 39. I say “might” enhance the law enforcement value because, as the amount 
of data increases, law enforcement will face challenges analyzing that data. Cf. 
Sandra I. Erwin, Too Much Information, Not Enough Intelligence, NAT’L DEF. 
MAG. (May 2012), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/May/ 
Pages/TooMuchInformation,NotEnoughIntelligence.aspx (last visited June 22, 
2015) (“Intelligence experts say the military is drowning in data but not able to 
convert that information into intelligible reports that break it down and analyze 
it.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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devices are being used, enabling the political process as a 
mechanism to hold operators accountable. 
In circumstances where publishing usage logs may reveal 
information that is law enforcement sensitive, such as an ongoing 
investigation, the agency operating the drone may keep their usage 
logs confidential until the investigation is closed. The agency 
should be required to make the logs public within thirty days of the 
close of an investigation. To facilitate public accountability, 
legislators should mandate that all logs be published in an open 
and machine-readable format consistent with the President’s 
Executive Order of May 9, 2013.40 
For evidence that this flight log approach works, one need only 
look across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom, where many police 
departments publish their helicopter flight logs on their webpage; 
in fact, some even live tweet their helicopters’ activities.41 While 
there is no law in the United Kingdom that specifically requires 
police departments or law enforcement agencies to publish the 
flight logs of their helicopters, their version of the Freedom of 
Information Act appears to be the legislative authority prompting 
publication of police helicopter logs.42  
Like the United States, there are a number of public watchdog 
groups in the United Kingdom that monitor police activity, 
including groups whose sole purpose is to monitor the activity—
and related noise complaints—of police helicopters.43 These 
groups, and their respective websites, act as a forum for noise and 
privacy complaints from various individuals across the Kingdom, 
and several of these groups organize and lobby Members of 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Barack Obama, Executive Order—Making Open and Machine 
Readable the New Default for Government Information, WHITE HOUSE (May 9, 
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/09/executive-order-
making-open-and-machine-readable-new-default-government- (last visited Oct. 
8, 2015) (providing an open data policy with directions for implementing the 
policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 41. See infra notes 43–49 and accompanying text (describing these police 
departments’ programs in greater detail). 
 42. See, e.g., Issue of Police Helicopter Flights at Night over South 
Hampstead London NW6 (LB Camden), WHATDOTHEYKNOW, 
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/issue_of_police_helicopter_fligh (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (providing the results of a FOIA request for information 
regarding certain police helicopter flights) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 43. See, e.g., id. (same). 
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Parliament (MPs) to pass legislation restricting helicopter 
flyovers.44 These groups, and the advocacy that they generate, 
appear to be largely responsible for the recent trend of many UK 
police departments publishing their helicopters’ flight logs or 
creating Twitter accounts for their helicopters that publish real-
time or delayed-time updates of the aircrafts’ activity.45 
These helicopter Twitter accounts, which have become a 
growing trend amongst British police departments, have had an 
immediate and powerful effect on public relations in their 
respective jurisdictions. In Islington, the police department went 
from struggling to handle the overload of noise complaints relating 
to the department’s use of its helicopter to receiving no complaints 
after the creation of its Helicopter Twitter feed.46 The Twitter 
account gained over 7,000 followers within its first few weeks, and 
the public criticism of police helicopter activity ceased entirely.47 
The department reflected on the effectiveness—as well as future 
potential—of the Twitter feed by issuing this statement: 
Maybe that is all people wanted—just to know and understand 
what we were doing. We don’t update people in real time, but 
my vision is that soon we will be able to let people know about 
an operation as soon as it is over. In some cases we could get 
them to help—imagine if an elderly person with Alzheimer’s 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Early Day Motion 394: Helicopter Flights over London, UK 
PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2012-13/394 (last visited Feb. 25, 
2015) (proposing legislation to regulate/reduce the amount of noise pollution 
caused by nighttime police helicopter flyovers in London) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. Not all activity is published. The Cleveland (UK) Police Department’s 
website indicates that: “This page is intended to provide basic information to the 
general public regarding the work of the police helicopter and will be updated on 
a daily basis. . . . Please note that not all items are always listed due to 
operational sensitivity or ongoing investigation.” Helicopter Watch, CLEVELAND 
POLICE, http://www.cleveland.police.uk/news/helicopter-watch.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. See Jon Dean, Police Helicopter Twitter Account Stops Islington 
Complaints, ISLINGTON GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.islington 
gazette.co.uk/news/police_helicopter_twitter_account_stops_islington_complaint
s_1_1206725 (last visited June 22, 2015) (“The Air Support Unit (ASU) say 
objections from Islington residents have dropped to zero since the Gazette 
published details of where and when the helicopters operated.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 47. See id. (“‘We have been staggered by the response to the Twitter 
account—we have 7,000 followers and it has only been going a few weeks.’”). 
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was missing in Islington, we could Tweet our followers to keep 
an eye out.48 
The Suffolk Police Department launched its Twitter feed with 
the hope of shedding some light on police practices. Roger Lewis, 
an observer with the Suffolk Police, described the department’s 
intentions in the following way: 
We hope to use the Twitter feed to highlight the positive work 
being done by the Air Operations Unit and to keep members of 
the public informed as to why the helicopter has been deployed. 
We hope people will enjoy finding out more about the Unit and 
hopefully our tweets will give some explanation as to why we 
have been deployed and give some interesting insights into a 
very important policing tool.49 
It is not difficult to see how the practice of disclosing non-
sensitive flight logs through a public channel—such as a 
department web page or Twitter—can be a useful tool in 
reassuring the public that law enforcement’s helicopter does not 
represent Big Brother’s eye in the sky, but rather embodies a part 
of the department’s lawful policing practices. Just as a police 
helicopter high overhead can be ominous to those on the ground 
who are unaware of its purposes, the very idea of drones—of any 
kind—flying above American cities and towns might be foreboding 
to many laypersons. By requiring law enforcement to publish data 
or logs, legislators can add a citizen-centric political check that will 
help quell the fears of a society that is not yet certain how it should 
react to the increasing presence of aerial surveillance devices over 
the skies of America. 
C. Institutionalize Oversight 
State and local governments may also want to create oversight 
boards modeled after the federal Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board. The local board could be comprised of appointees 
drawn from the community. Such a surveillance oversight board 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. 
 49. Suffolk Police, UK’s Suffolk Police Helicopter Unit Now on Twitter, 
HELIHUB (Sept. 3, 2012), http://helihub.com/2012/09/03/uks-suffolk-police-
helicopter-unit-now-on-twitter/ (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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could have a cross-section of civil liberties and law enforcement 
minded individuals who could conduct audits of surveillance 
activities. Such audits might include reviewing data that was 
collected, checking for compliance with accountability procedures, 
or searching for areas where discriminatory targeting may be 
occurring. 
Independent oversight bodies can provide policymakers with 
a transparency-oriented means to ensure accountability and 
expose wrongdoing, but they may also deter wrongdoing.50 If police 
departments know that an oversight board will be auditing their 
activity, it may convince them to live up to the expectations and 
standards embedded in law.51 This, of course, assumes that 
policymakers want to change the status quo, but the amount of 
drone-related legislation being proposed in various jurisdictions 
suggests that legislators are in fact interested in making 
changes.52 Moreover, the intense public interest in the issue 
suggests that there are many incentives for elected officials to 
exercise greater oversight of drone surveillance, as there is 
substantial interest group advocacy associated with the topic. 
While legislators may have interest in the topic, they may not have 
the time or resources to exercise intense oversight. A dedicated 
oversight board could specialize in overseeing surveillance 
activities. 
There are good reasons to believe that independent oversight 
of surveillance might be quite successful.53 As legal scholars Eric 
Posner and Adrian Vermeule have pointed out, independent 
commissions can be established to review policies before and after 
                                                                                                     
 50. For a lengthier discussion of accountability, see generally Gregory S. 
McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681 (2014). 
 51. See ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 14 (2001) 
(discussing deterrence). 
 52. For a discussion of the status quo, see Gregory S. McNeal, Preventative 
Detention: The Status Quo Bias and Counterterrorism Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 855, 882–83 (2012) (describing the status quo bias in 
policymaking); cf. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING & POLICY CHANGE: 
WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 43 (2009) (“Even if policy makers recognize that 
the policy is imperfect or the result of an error, . . . it may still be a hard sell to 
convince others, especially those in leadership positions, that the current policy 
is working so badly that it must be overhauled.”). 
 53. Cf. McNeal, supra note 50, at 785–93 (discussing plausible accountability 
reforms that could enhance the accountability of the targeted killing process). 
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the fact, and politicians might gain credibility by binding 
themselves to give the commissions authority along various 
dimensions.54 Policymakers might promise to follow the 
recommendations of a commission and give power to a commission 
to review the success of policy choices related to drones.55 
Independent oversight boards can be successful because they 
signal the interests of politicians in maintaining credibility and 
winning the support of the public, and a willingness to make 
information available that could subject the government to 
criticism.56 Independent oversight boards allow politicians to claim 
that they are holding law enforcement accountable, while at the 
same time shifting the blame for poor accountability decisions to 
others—ensuring that politicians can exercise oversight without 
needing to fear blowback from powerful law enforcement unions.57 
The first challenge associated with such an approach is to 
ensure that police departments provide surveillance information 
to the oversight board, which requires the board to be empowered 
by law. Second, for an oversight board to be successful from the 
outset, it will require political support. A failure on the part of 
politicians to empower an oversight board may engender political 
fallout for the policymakers who established the oversight board, 
but only if the commissioners have a means to communicate their 
lack of empowerment. The board, once appointed, may operate as 
independent investigators who will have an interest in ensuring 
that they are not stonewalled. Because these members will be 
appointed by politicians with their own agendas, however, or the 
board members themselves may have political ambition, the 
                                                                                                     
 54. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 141 (2010) (discussing independent 
commissions). 
 55. See id. (same). 
 56. Cf. McNeal, supra note 50, at 787 (discussing how reporting 
requirements for certain information could encourage civilian protection). 
 57. For a discussion of the power of law enforcement unions, see generally 
HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM: POWER AND IMPACT IN 
PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING (1973); David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s 
Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006); Michael Tracey, The Pernicious Power 
of the Police Lobby, VICE (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.vice.com/read/the-pernicious-
power-of-police-unions (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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individuals chosen may have reason to avoid exposing abusive 
surveillance practices that might create political enemies amongst 
law enforcement. That reality may temper the success of an 
independent oversight board, but these challenges are inherent in 
any form of oversight—for example, local elected judges who 
approve warrant applications are not immune from these 
influences. 
D. Use Technology as a Way to Protect Privacy, Not Merely Gather 
Data 
Perhaps the biggest problem with a warrant requirement is 
that it fails to recognize that, someday, surveillance from 
unmanned aircraft may be more protective of privacy than manned 
surveillance. Technology continues to evolve at such a rapid pace 
that it is possible drones and other aerial surveillance technologies 
may enable targeted surveillance that protects collateral privacy 
harms, while still allowing for the collection of evidence. 
Technology can further the goal of privacy by using geofencing to 
only collect evidence from specific locations and using redaction 
programming to automatically obscure information—such as 
faces—at the point of collection.58 Creative policymakers can 
embrace technology by writing laws requiring that aerial 
surveillance devices have systems to protect privacy.  
For example, imagine that the police receive a tip about 
marijuana growing in the backyard of 123 Main Street. They 
dispatch a helicopter to gather aerial photographs of the 123 Main 
Street property from an altitude of 700 feet. While the police are 
overhead photographing 123 Main Street, they look down and see 
a woman sunbathing in the adjacent property at 125 Main Street. 
While the inadvertent observation of the woman at 125 Main 
Street does not violate her Fourth Amendment rights, it will likely 
be viewed from her perspective as an offensive intrusion that 
                                                                                                     
 58. Cf. What is Geofencing?, TECHOPEDIA [hereinafter Geofencing], 
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/14937/geofencing (last visited Feb. 25, 
2015) (“Geofencing is a technology that defines a virtual boundary around a real-
world geographical area. In doing so, a radius of interest is established that can 
trigger an action in a geo-enabled phone or other portable electronic device.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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violates her personal expectation of privacy—even if it is not one 
that society, per Supreme Court jurisprudence, is willing to deem 
reasonable. But now imagine the same collection scenario, this 
time conducted by a drone or a camera on a manned helicopter with 
software that is programmed to protect privacy. Prior to the 
mission, the aircraft would be instructed to only document the 
activities ongoing at 123 Main Street. The software could be 
required to automatically redact any additional information 
gathered from adjoining properties—such as 125 Main Street, the 
home of our hypothetical sunbather.59 Furthermore, legislators 
could also require that software automatically redact the faces of 
individuals.60  
The redaction could be removed at a later date, perhaps after 
a showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause (the particular 
standard to be determined by the legislature) to believe that the 
auto-redacted person’s face is important because they are or were 
involved in criminal activity. If a state or local government 
required that aircraft engaged in aerial surveillance be coded for 
privacy, the rights of the adjacent sunbather and any other 
inadvertently observed individuals would be protected. If such 
policies were imposed, society may evolve to the point where 
drones are mandated when manned flights might place law 
enforcement officers in a situation where they could be tempted to 
make unwanted observations of innocent people. Warrant 
                                                                                                     
 59. Cf. id. (defining geofencing and its capabilities); Chris Hackett & Michael 
Grosinger, The Growth of Geofence Tools Within the Mapping Technology Sphere, 
PDVWIRELESS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.pdvwireless.com/the-growth-of-
geofence-tools-within-the-mapping-technology-sphere/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015) 
(“Geofencing also represents a critical element within telematics hardware and 
software. It allows system users to draw zones around places of work, customer 
sites and secure areas.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. See 2seas uav, 3i Movie, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2014), https://youtube/ 
wHQnpfgvK1o (describing the capabilities of “smart surveillance” technologies); 
Eric Pfeiffer, How a Seattle Programmer Used Public Records Laws to Push Police 
to Fix a Surveillance Video Tech Headache, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.govexec.com/state-local/2015/01/seattle-police-camera-video-redact 
ion/102483/ (last visited June 22, 2015) (“We can use a software program to 
transcribe and remove audio. It would really deal with the privacy issues. I wrote 
a simple script that looks for and is able to properly remove the personal 
information exactly how they do it by hand. It’s very precise.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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requirements do little to allow this type of privacy protective 
technology to develop; they merely act as a soft ban on drones. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Essay argues that state and local governments will need 
to address data retention issues related to drones. It argues that 
governments should enact laws mandating data retention 
procedures that require heightened levels of suspicion and 
increased procedural protections for accessing stored data 
gathered by aerial surveillance, coupled with a requirement that 
data be deleted after a legislatively mandated period of time.61 
Second, governments should impose enhanced transparency and 
accountability measures, requiring agencies to publish 
information about the use of aerial surveillance devices—both 
manned and unmanned—on a regular basis and should consider 
creating local oversight boards to police the use of surveillance 
technologies.62 Third, cities should institutionalize oversight and 
auditing procedures.63 Fourth, legal reformers should recognize 
that technology such as auto-redaction may make aerial 
surveillance by drones more protective of privacy than human 
surveillance.64 
                                                                                                     
 61. See supra Part V.A (setting forth this argument). 
 62. See supra Part V.B (outlining these methods of achieving transparency 
and accountability). 
 63. See supra Part V.C (advising municipalities on this matter). 
 64. See supra Part V.D (describing how technology could work to actually 
protect citizens’ privacy). 
